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In many countries growing concern is being expressed about the position  of 
skilled manpower-particularly  of scientists and engineers. In some cases the 
complaint  is about skill shortages, and  in others about “brain  drains’’-the 
flow of highly trained manpower to other countries. While these are sometimes 
coupled as different facets of the same problem, the first phenomenon arises 
because  of  a  “failure”  of  supply,  while  the  second  reflects  a  “failure”  of 
demand. 
Many arguments (not all very convincing) have been used to suggest that 
these phenomena are undesirable and that governments  should develop poli- 
cies to produce more skilled labor or better retain that which they already have. 
We focus on the argument that this skilled manpower is of strategic importance 
to an economy because  it is essential to the performance  of  its “high-tech” 
sector. We will show that the recent work on strategic trade and industrial pol- 
icy using models of international trade with imperfect competition and econo- 
mies of scale provides a useful framework in which arguments about the scope 
and desirability of  such manpower policies can be assessed and quantified. 
When calibrated, our model shows that manpower policies are potentially ex- 
tremely powerful and important. 
However, the focus of the paper is not really manpower policies, for we hope 
our analysis will demonstrate the crucial importance of  understanding these 
David Ulph is professor of economics at University College, London. L. Alan Winters is profes- 
sor of economics at the University of  Birmingham and codirector of  the International Trade Pro- 
gramme at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
The authors are grateful for the financial support received from the Ford Foundation through 
the NBEWCEPR program Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. They are also grateful to 
Larry Katz, participants at the conference, and anonymous referees for comments on an earlier 
version. 
157 158  David Ulph and L. Alan Winters 
manpower issues when formulating trade and industrial policies aimed at sup- 
porting a country’s high-tech sector. 
In section 7.1 we develop a model of an open economy  with a high-tech 
sector in which skilled manpower is used in R&D to produce improved lower- 
cost techniques of production. There are three further crucial features of the 
high-tech  sector. The market for the output of this sector is the world market, 
of which the particular economy is only a very small part. Because of the fixed 
costs of R&D there are only a few major international firms competing in this 
market, so it is inherently imperfectly competitive. However, because in R&D 
success breeds success, entry cannot prevent these major firms from enjoying 
supernormal profits or rents even after deduction of  the costs of R&D. The 
simplest way of capturing this in our model is to operate with a fixed number 
of firms. Cantwell (1989a) provides the most recent evidence and a good dis- 
cussion of  this  persistence  phenomenon.  Taken together  these  assumptions 
mean that the model is essentially one in which countries are in competition 
with one another through their manpower and industrial policies to get as large 
a share of these rents from the international market as they can. 
This framework is essentially  that used by Brander and Spencer (1983) in 
their argument for support of R&D. As is well known, there are a number of 
objections to the Brander and Spencer analysis. Dixit and Grossman (1986) 
show that it depends crucially on the assumption that scientific manpower is 
essentially in perfectly elastic supply to the high-tech sector. They show that 
if it is completely inelastic and immobile, then support to the high-tech sector 
has to be very carefully targeted to have a beneficial effect. While concerns 
over skill shortages are captured by the inelastic supply assumption, the “brain 
drain” phenomenon suggests that the immobility assumption is unrealistic. We 
show that if scientific manpower is mobile then, while support to any arbitrary 
high-tech industry could be damaging, a policy giving more general support to 
the high-tech sector as a whole will be beneficial. We extend this to consider 
the arguments for policy when  it is science that is mobile, with  companies 
setting up their R&D labs at centers where scientific  manpower is concen- 
trated. 
These arguments for support of high-tech industries are tested by allowing 
for the possibility of international spillovers (in which case it may pay to free- 
ride on the R&D of  other countries), and by having research undertaken by 
internationally mobile scientists while development is performed by immobile 
engineers. The final part of section 7.1 considers the nature of R&D policies 
and shows that if scientists are indeed mobile, then policies should be aimed 
at encouraging greater demand for them, and a policy of encouraging supply 
is positively harmful. 
The model in section 7.1 is what is known in the R&D literature as a non- 
tournament model, in which each firm can pursue its own independent line of 
R&D. Even if one firm makes its discovery  first and patents it, the lines of 
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successfully developing, patenting, and using their own discoveries. In section 
7.2 we briefly consider what happens when R&D takes the form of a tourna- 
ment, in which firms race to be the first to patent their discovery, because the 
patent prevents any other firms from exploiting its R&D. We  show that many 
of the arguments of the nontournament model are reversed. 
In section 7.3 we calibrate the model of mobile scientists developed in sec- 
tion 7.1 and show that R&D policy can be powerful. Thus a given amount of 
resources transferred as a subsidy to R&D can increase GNP by  two-and-a- 
half times the amount transferred-an  extremely high rate of  return. Finally, 
in  section 7.4 we present the evidence that is available on mobility and on 
spillovers. Unfortunately, none of  this is in  a form that would enable us  to 
calculate an elasticity. Nevertheless, it does seem to suggest a fair degree of 
mobility and so, within our framework, definite scope for beneficial policy 
support of the high-tech sector. 
7.1  Nontournament Models 
7.1.1  The Basic Model 
There are two countries, each having two sectors. In the first sector a homo- 
geneous product is produced under constant returns to scale and perfectly com- 
petitive conditions using labor alone. Output is measured in such a way  that 
one unit of  output requires one unit of  labor to produce it. Thus taking the 
output of this sector as numeraire, the wage rate of labor will be one. 
In the second sector there are n imperfectly competitive industries. In each 
industry production  takes place under constant returns to scale using labor 
alone. For each industry there is a single firm in each of  the two countries 
undertaking production in that industry. For country 1, u, represents the amount 
of  labor required per unit of  output; for country 2 the labor requirement is 
denoted by  b,.  Given our previous assumptions, uJ and b,  also represent unit 
production costs in each of the two firms in industryj. 
Given these unit production costs, the profitslrents accruing to country  1 
in a Cournot equilibrium in industry j are denoted by  rJ(uJ,  b,). Introducing 
the notation 
rJa  = drJ/duJ,  etc., 
then standard models of imperfect competition suggest that the functions r,(.;) 
will satisfy the following properties: 
(1)  rJa  < 0,  rJ,, > 0,  rJb  > 0,  rJab  < 0. 
Thus an increase in the unit labor requirements of country 1 reduces its profits, 
but at a diminishing rate as these requirements get larger: if  country 1’s  labor 
requirements are already large, then its market share will be  small, and  so 
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labor requirements had initially been  smaller and market share consequently 
larger. An increase in country 2’s unit production costs increases country  1’s 
profits, while finally, the larger country 2’s labor requirements are, the greater 
country  1’s market  share is, and so, again, the more it will be damaged by 
further increases in its own labor requirements. 
We  now assume that each firm’s unit production costs/labor requirements 
depend on the amount of R&D it undertakes, while this in turn depends on the 
number of  scientists/engineers it employs. Thus if we let x,  be the number of 
scientists employed by the firm in the jth industry in country I and y, the nurn- 
ber in country 2, then we assume that 
where 
If  we let cl  be the effective wage rate of  a scientisvengineer  faced by the 
firm in industry j in country 1, then, taking the unit production cost in the firm 
in country 2 as given, x,  is chosen to be 
Assuming that +,(.)  is sufficiently concave that the overall maximand is con- 
cave in x,  and that we always have interior solutions then, the unique solution 
to the above maximization problem is characterized by the first-order condi- 
tion (f.0.c.) 
(2) 
If d, denotes the effective wage rate of scientists in thejth industry in country 
2, then the Nash equilibrium inputs of  scientists in industry j  in the two coun- 
tries will be functions of the effective  wage rates  of  scientists in these two 
countries: c, and d,.  Write these as 
CJ.  +’ =  - 
(3)  x,  = t,(c,,  41,  and 
(4)  4; = $C,>  d,). 
< 0, rl,d  < 0, 
Standard conditions suggest that for a wide class of cases 
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so an increase in each firm’s costs of hiring scientists lowers its equilibrium 
input of scientists. In addition, we assume 
(6)  -  qjd > &i ’  ‘9  -  6jc >  ~JC  >  ‘7 
so that an increase in a firm’s costs of hiring scientists increases the demand 
for scientists by the other firm but by less in absolute magnitude then it reduces 
the firm’s own demand, thus leading to a net fall in the demand for scientists. 
(7) 
so that if the costs of hiring scientists in both countries increase, then the cross- 
price effect of this is less than the own-price effect, leading to an overall reduc- 
tion in demand. 
Thus the fundamental determinants of the rentdprofits earned by each coun- 
try in any industry are the effective wage rates of scientists faced by that indus- 
try in each of the two countries. For through (3) and (4) these determine the 
number of  scientists employed in that industry in each of the two countries: 
these determine the unit production costs u, and b,, which in turn determine 
the rents. 
Having set out the basic model we can now turn to a variety of policy issues. 
Throughout our analysis we will equate welfare with national income. This 
involves, among other things, following Brander and Spencer in assuming that 
all high-tech goods are exported. Thus we can ignore consumption distortions 
and terms of trade effects on consumers. We start with the standard Brander 
and Spencer result. 
7.1.2  The Brander and Spencer Result 
Suppose country 1 introduces an R&D subsidy in industry k, which we take 
to be a subsidy, sk  to the costs of hiring scientists in industry k, k  C  { 1,  . . .  JZ}. 
What effect does this have on its welfare? 
Implicit in the Brander and Spencer analysis is the assumption that the sub- 
sidy does not affect the (gross) prices at which industries in the high-tech sec- 
tor can hire resources from the competitive sector. In our model this is equiva- 
lent to the assumption that labor and scientists are perfect substitutes. 
Welfare in country 1 is given by income, which is labor income plus profits 
(rents minus costs of hiring scientists). Given the above assumption this can 
be written 
In a similar vein we assume 
- tJC  >  E,d  > 0, -  ?,d  >  rlJC  > 0, 
where L is the total amount of labor, and we note that the profits of industry k 
are the social profits-that  is scientists are priced at their true cost (unity) since 
the subsidy is a pure transfer within the economy. 
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So to determine the effect on welfare of an increase in s,  evaluated at the point 
where sk = 0, we differentiate W totally w.r.t.  s,,  using (8) and (9) to take ac- 
count of how sk affects x,  and yk.  Doing this, and recalling the f.0.c. (2),  we get 
(10) 
which, from (1) and (6),  is strictly positive. 
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. The subsidy to the indus- 
try increases the amount of R&D the firm in industry k in country  1 does and 
lowers the amount done in country 2. However, with sk  initially zero, the firm 
in country 1 was doing the socially optimal amount of R&D, so increasing the 
amount it does has no first-order effect on welfare. But lowering the amount 
done in country  2 increases its costs, contracts its output, and so raises the 
price at which country 1 can sell its output, and this brings a first-order increase 
to the  rents earned by  country  1. Thus Brander and Spencer conclude that 
introducing an (R&D) subsidy into any imperfectly competitive high-tech in- 
dustry is always beneficial. 
7.1.3 
dWlds, = rkb  . +;  . qkc, 
The Dixit and Grossman Results 
Dixit and Grossman argue that what makes these industries high-tech indus- 
tries are essential inputs of “scientists” or “technologists,” which are not used 
at all in sector 1, but are essential inputs to industries in sector 2.  The critical 
feature which this introduces is that an industry in sector 2 cannot expand just 
by drawing in additional labor from the non-rent-generating sector 1, but now, 
assuming a fixed supply of scientists, will have to absorb additional scientists 
from other high-tech sectors, thus impairing their rent-generating capability. 
To capture these ideas, Dixit and Grossman assume that labor and “scien- 
tists” are combined in fixed proportions in each high-tech industry. However, 
we have modeled  the role of  scientists more explicitly, and in terms of our 
model the essence of the Dixit-Grossman model is that scientists are no longer 
perfect  substitutes for labor  and have  a  separate endogenously  determined 
gross wage rate. If we let w be the wage of scientists in country 1 and v their 
wage rate in country 2, then social welfare in country 1 can be written 
(11) 
where now, once we add the income of scientists to the profits of the high-tech 
industries, national income is just labor income plus rents, the question of who 
gets the rents being a distributional one of no direct relevance to total welfare. 
Assuming once again that a subsidy s,  is introduced into industry j,  the num- 
ber of scientists in each industry is given by 
W = L + c  r,b:  -  +,,<x,>, bp -  $,(Y,)l, 
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(12) 
(13) 
x,  = s,(w -  s,,  v), and 
Y, = q,(w -  J,*  v), 
while the wage of scientists in country 1 is determined by the condition 
(14) 
Following Dixit and Grossman, we assume the wage of scientists in country 2, 
v, is fixed. 
Now when we want to examine the effects of a subsidy on, say, industry k 
alone we have to differentiate (11) totally w.r.t.  s,,  taking account of how all 
the x,,  y,,  and w vary through (12)-(14).  Using the f.0.c. (2) we get 
(15) 
c  s,<w -  s,,  v) = s. 
J 
dWldsk = (dwlds,)  (w  . eJc -  rJb  . $,’  . qJJ] + 
while from (14), 
The intuition behind (15) is as follows. The second term, in parentheses, on 
the right-hand side tells us that the subsidy has two direct effects. The first, 
represented by the last term, is just the Brander and Spencer effect already 
discussed. The second is that it expands the number of scientists in industry k 
earning the rent w.  However, because  the number of  scientists is fixed, the 
subsidy has the indirect effect of raising the wage rate of scientists, which will 
act like a tax on every high-tech industry, having precisely the reverse of these 
two effects on every industry. This is what the first term on the right-hand side 
of (15) shows. 
The most important point to notice here is that, if we sum (16) over all k 
we get 
(17)  (dwlds,) = 1, 
k= I 
and so, on substituting (16) into (15) and summing over all k we get 
n  c  (dWlds,) = 0, 
k=  I 
so that introducing a subsidy into all industries simultaneously just drives up 
the scientists’ wage rate to exactly offset the effect of the subsidy, and so has 
no effect on any industry, or on welfare. But then, looking at  subsidies on 
individual industries, there must be some industries for which a subsidy has 164  David Ulph and L. Alan Winters 
positive welfare effects and others for which it is harmful. Thus while a care- 
fully targeted subsidy can be beneficial, an arbitrarily chosen one may not be- 
the essential Dixit-Grossman conclusion. 
7.1.4  Mobile Scientists 
A key feature of  the Dixit-Grossman  model  is the fact that scientists are 
internationally immobile,  and so a country’s expansion of one industry can 
only take place at the expense of another in that country. The frequently voiced 
concerns about “brain drains” suggests that this feature of the model may be 
crucially unrealistic, so it is interesting to explore the policy implications of 
allowing scientists to be internationally mobile. 
We  therefore  adopt the  alternative  extreme assumption that  scientists are 
perfectly mobile internationally. This has two immediate effects on our previ- 
ous model: 
1. In (12) and (13) v = w,  as there is now a single international wage for sci- 
entists. 
2. The scientists’ resource constraint (14) now has to be written 
where now S is the total supply of scientists in the world. 
The formulation of the welfare function now needs some consideration. If 
we assume that the income of  scientists accrues to the country in which they 
work, then the welfare function is once again given by (11). This assumption 
clearly reflects deeper underlying assumptions about both the behavior of sci- 
entists (not remitting their income home) and of the tax authorities (they cannot 
or do not tax the income of people working abroad, but can and do tax all the 
income of people working within their country). This latter statement is made 
in the context of our earlier assumption, in which we just equated welfare with 
GNP. When we move beyond that framework, we also have to confront more 
fundamental issues concerning what set of citizens is to be included in a na- 
tionalistic welfare criterion. An alternative assumption about where the income 
of scientists accrues will be considered in the next section. 
Suppose then country  1 imposes a subsidy on industry k. What is the effect 
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The intuition behind (20) is precisely the same as for (13, the only difference 
being that the increase in the wage rate affects the equilibrium outputs by rai- 
sing costs in both country 1 and country 2. 
From (3,  (6) and (21) it follows that 
0 <  dwlds, < 1, 
and indeed that, if we define 
8 =  (dwlds,), 
k=l 
thenO<e< 1. 
Moreover, summing over (20),  we get, 
which, given our sign conventions in (l),  (5)  and (6), is strictly positive. 
The intuition is that blanket subsidies to all high-tech industries in country 
1 cause them to attract scientists from other parts of the world by increasing 
the wage rate. But, because there are scientists elsewhere, their wage does not 
have to rise by as much as the subsidy. This means that overall costs in country 
1 do fall, which benefits the country. However, there is a second effect, which is 
that the rise in the international wage of scientists increases costs of production 
elsewhere, which is again to the benefit  of  country  1. Now,  as in Dixit and 
Grossman, there is no guarantee that a subsidy to any given industry increases 
welfare, but, in contrast to their model, a general subsidy to the high-tech sec- 
tor is warranted. 
An important point about the results in this section is that although we have 
assumed that scientists are perfectly mobile internationaily, in fact, any degree 
of mobility will be sufficient to generate the two effects of a blanket subsidy 
discussed above: that the wage of domestic scientists does not rise by as much 
as the subsidy and that there is an increase in the wage of overseas scientists. 
Hence any degree of  mobility will suffice for a policy of blanket support to 
be beneficial. 
Notice also that, as Dixit and Grossman themselves recognize, if there were 
some degree of internal supply elasticity of scientists, a policy of blanket sub- 
sidies could have positive welfare effects. However, the magnitude of the re- 
sponse could be different, because of the different effects of the subsidy on the 
wages of  scientists in the overseas country. Also, as we show in section 7.8, 
the interpretation of policy  can be very different when there is international 
mobility rather than internal supply elasticity. 166  David Ulph and L. Alan Winters 
7.1.5  Immobile Scientists, Mobile Science 
An alternative possibility is that scientists are internationally immobile but 
that science is not-that  is, that firms can buy scientific research from scien- 
tists located in other parts of the world. Given problems of confidentiality, this 
may entail locating an R&D lab in that other country-which  appears to be 
what multinational corporations  (MNCs) do (see section 7.4.2, below). For- 
mally this is equivalent to the outcome that arises when scientists are mobile 
but either they remit their earnings home or else their “home” country can 
tax away their earnings. What are the policy implications of the possibility of 
mobile science? 
We assume that science is perfectly mobile in the sense that it is perfectly 
homogeneous so that companies always buy their science at the lowest price, 
so once again the wage of  scientists will be the same in both countries. If S 
once again stands for the total number of scientists in both countries, while S’ 
stands for those in country  1, then the overall scientist resource constraint is 
once again given by (19), while the equilibrium outputs of the various indus- 
tries are once again given by (12) and (13), with w =  v. 
The main difference is that since country  1 is not confined  to buying its 
science at home and its scientists are not confined to working for home indus- 
tries, the welfare function becomes 
w = L + C{r,[a; -  +](XI), by  -  *,(y,)] -  w ‘ XI} + w .  S’. 
J 
We then find that 
dWlds, = (dwlds,) .  S‘ - C  x,  -  [r,,, . # . (qjc  + qjdl} 
{I  j 
where dwlds, is once again given by (21) and so is positive. The last term on 
the right-hand side of (23) is the Brander and Spencer effect. 
From (7) the last term in the braces is positive, reflecting the fact that all 
industries in country 1 gain because the increase in the wage induced by  the 
subsidy forces  all industries  in country  2 to contract. Finally  if  S1 2  El  xj, 
meaning that the country is not a net importer of science, then driving the price 
of science up is not harmful. 
We  thus reach the conclusion that if the country is not a net importer of 
science, then a subsidy to any arbitrary high-tech industry is positively benefi- 
cial-which  is the Brander and Spencer conclusion. However, if the country 
is a net importer of science, then even a uniform subsidy may not be desirable. 
A major determinant of whether or not a country is a net importer or exporter 
of science will be the number of scientists it has. In this case, to justify what 
is here a policy of encouraging the demand for scientists may only be appro- 
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7.1.6  Distinguishing between Research and Development 
In most of the economics literature, research and development are treated as 
a single process labeled R&D. However, in a number of contexts it is now 
being recognized that it is important to distinguish carefully between research 
and development as two distinct though interrelated features of the process of 
generating new products/technologies. This distinction could be particularly 
important in the context of the models discussed in the preceding two sections, 
for it might be that while the “scientists” who work on research are fairly mo- 
bile, the “engineers” who work on development are not. Equally, while it may 
be possible for companies to locate research labs abroad where the scientists 
are, development work must take place where production is to be carried out. 
To  explore the implications of this distinction we will now assume that re- 
search requires inputs of scientists, while development requires inputs of engi- 
neers, and that, in country 1 (resp., country 2), for every scientist employed in 
industryj, a,  (resp.,  f3,)  engineers have to be employed. Thus there are fixed 
proportions in research and development, capturing the idea that the two are 
distinct and necessary phases of investment, and one cannot be substituted for 
the other. 
Even though on the demand side, scientists and engineers may not be substi- 
tutable,  it is always possible that they  are perfect  substitutes on the supply 
side-that  essentially  there is a pool of people who become either scientists 
or engineers, depending on which pays most. In this case nothing in our model 
would  be  affected. The more interesting case, then, is where  scientists and 
engineers are imperfect substitutes on the supply side as well. We will assume 
that there is a fixed supply of scientists and a fixed supply of engineers. 
Without working through the analysis formally, it is fairly clear from our 
earlier work that if both factors are internationally immobile then we will once 
again obtain the Dixit-Grossman results implying that subsidies are unlikely 
to be beneficial. On the other hand if both factors are perfectly mobile interna- 
tionally we will replicate the results of section 7. l .4, and a general sector-wide 
subsidy to R&D will be beneficial. 
Suppose then that scientists are internationally mobile, with world wage w, 
while engineers are internationally immobile, with a wage v in country 1 and 
vr  in country 2. Since the income of engineers nets out from the profits of the 
firms, social welfare is once again given by (1  1). If we think of the government 
introducing a subsidy which either lowers the wage of scientists (in all indus- 
tries) by an amount s, or the wage of engineers by an amount u, then the re- 
source constraints become 
t{S,[W -  s + g(v -  u),w + PjV’] + 
/=I 
q,[w -  s + aj(v -  a),w + f3,v’l} = s, 168  David Ulph and L. Alan Winters 
and 
n  CaJ $[w -  s + a,(” -  @),w  + P,u’]  = E, 
J= I 
where S is the world supply of scientists, and E is the supply of engineers in 
country 1. 
If we just differentiate these two equations, it is easily seen that dwldo = 0 
and dvldu = I, so an attempt to subsidize the demand for engineers just drives 
up their wages to exactly offset the subsidy and has no welfare gain at all. Thus 
we get the Dixit-Grossman result again. 
A subsidy to the use of scientists has more complex effects. However, one 
special case is where a, =  a for all j.  In this case dwlds = 0 and dvlds = lla, 
so the wage of engineers rises to exactly offset the subsidy to scientists, and 
we once again get the Dixit-Grossman results. The intuition is clear. The mo- 
bility  of scientists is irrelevant  when faced with completely immobile engi- 
neers who are required in a fixed ratio to scientists. 
When the uJ are not uniform there will be some cases where a general sub- 
sidy to scientists is beneficial  and some where it is not, but the information 
required to determine when these cases arise will be difficult to obtain. The 
general conclusion then is that policies of  subsidy are not a good idea when 
there  is  some  irremovable fixity  of  supply, however  much  flexibility  there 
might be elsewhere. 
7.1.7  Spillovers 
In the literature on spillovers it is generally argued that the presence of spill- 
overs is a reason why the private rate of return to R&D is less than the social 
rate of return, so there is a justification for policy intervention  to encourage 
firms to undertake R&D. However, strictly speaking, this  only applies to a 
closed economy. In terms of  our model this could be interpreted as the case 
where the spillovers occur purely within each country, and, given that there is 
only one firm in each industry, these would then be pure interindustry spill- 
overs. Since this case is familiar we will not analyze it formally here. 
An alternative  case that we will consider here is where the spillovers are 
purely intraindustry, but cut across national boundaries. As is intuitively obvi- 
ous, and as we will show, such spillovers could provide a reason for not under- 
taking a policy of supporting domestic R&D, essentially because the country 
could free-ride on R&D being undertaken elsewhere. These two cases by  no 
means exhaust all the possibilities,  but it is clear that in general how far spill- 
overs provide a rationale for supporting R&D is going to depend on the balance 
between internal and external spillovers. 
We can capture the presence  of  intraindustry cross-national spillovers by 
assuming that now 
(25)  aJ =  -  4,(xJ + P,  .  Y,)  and bJ = b:  -  ~J~:<Y,  + P,  .  xJ). 
where PJ, 0 5  P,  5  1, is the degree of spillover in industryj. 169  Strategic Manpower Policy and International Trade 
We assume that spillovers are recognized by firms in each country, so that, 
for example, the first-order condition for choice of x,  is now 
(26) 
with an analogous condition for the firm in country 2. 
We assume that the cross-effects of the spillovers are not sufficiently strong 
to offset the direct effects, so that once again there are interior solutions for x, 
and y,  and all the properties  of  the scientists’ demand functions, el(.,.) and 
q,(.;),  continue to hold. 
Then it is easily seen that in the Brander and Spencer case the effect of 
introducing a subsidy to the kth industry in country 1 is given by 
-  (r,o . +,’  + P,  ’ r,b  . *]’> =  CJ7 
Given our assumptions that own-effects dominate cross-effects then it is pos- 
sible that for sufficiently large values of  P,  the term in  parentheses in (27) 
could be zero or negative, thus negating even the basic Brander and Spencer 
argument for subsidies. 
7.1.8  The Nature of Policies 
So far we have talked rather vaguely about the government adopting a policy 
of subsidizing R&D in either one or all high-tech industries without its being 
very clear what the nature of this subsidy is. Formally we have treated it as 
something which just lowers the effective cost of scientists. It might be thought 
that this could encompass a number of different  policies,  such as  allowing 
companies a more generous provision to write off R&D expenditures for tax 
purposes, explicit cooperative ventures with government, R&D expenditures 
by government that generates significant spillovers to the private high-tech sec- 
tor, or a policy of generous grants to students to become scientists, thus low- 
ering the costs of scientists to private industry. The point we wish to make here 
is that, while in a closed economy it probably does not matter very much which 
of these policies are adopted, in an open economy with mobile labor it matters 
a great deal. The essential point is that the fundamental market failure that 
generates the rationale for policy in all of these models is that, due to its imper- 
fectly competitive nature, the private sector does not sufficiently expand its 
production. Consequently, it insufficiently expands its use of R&D and hence 
its demand for scientists. Fundamentally it is this lack of demand that has to 
be tackled. 
While in a closed economy this lack of demand can be cured by reducing 
the cost of training scientists and hence encouraging firms to use more of them, 
in an open economy with mobile scientists this policy is disastrous because it 
simply lowers the cost of  scientists to the rival country conferring to it all 
the benefit. 
To demonstrate this more formally we need to extend our analysis to model 
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then we have a pool of labor L. A worker in this pool can either remain an 
unskilled worker getting a wage of 1, or else become a scientist. To do this she 
has to spend a proportion  IT of her working life in training, during which she 
earns nothing and incurs recurrent costs c,  but then earns w for the remaining 
proportion  of  her  working  life.  Clearly  this  will  be  worthwhile  only  if 
(1 -   IT)^ -  ITC > 1, that is, if  IT <  (w -  l)/(w + c). 
We assume that people differ in their ability to become scientists, which we 
capture by their having different values of  T,  which we assume to be distrib- 
uted  in  the population  according to the density function F(.). Given  w,  the 
critical value of IT at which an individual is indifferent between becoming and 
not becoming a scientist is 
(28)  %(w)  = (w - l)/(w + c). 
mobile, social welfare becomes 
With these changes, then, assuming once again that scientists are perfectly 
If we consider first the case where there is a uniform subsidy s  to the demand 
for scientists, then the international wage of  scientists is determined by  the 
resource constraint 
where S2(w)  is the supply of  scientific manpower from country 2, and we as- 
sume dS,/dw 2  0. 
Proceeding as before in section 7.1.4 we find that 
If we compare this with (23) we see that the only difference from our previous 
analysis is that there is now an additional potential gain to country 1 from its 
subsidy policy, because the higher wage of scientists could induce additional 
supply from country 2. Although this also induces more supply from country 
1, since the  individuals who are affected were initially  indifferent between 
becoming a scientist and not, this additional supply confers no welfare gain. 
An alternative policy could be to subsidize the supply of scientists which we 
could interpret as a reduction in c. Thus, now 
(30) 
With an appropriate adjustment to the resource constraint (29) to take account 
of the fact that there is no longer a demand subsidy, we find 
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Given our sign conventions the term in square brackets is unambiguously posi- 
tive, but it is easy to see that dwlds < 0, since encouraging supply lowers the 
wage, so the policy of  subsidizing the supply of scientists is unambiguously 
harmful. It both reduces the supply of scientists from country 2 and lowers the 
cost of R&D for all the rival industries. Thus if scientists are internationally 
mobile, policies should be targeted at increasing demand for them, not their 
supply. 
7.2  Tournament Models 
7.2.1  The Basic Model 
Here we just sketch the outlines of  the model. The details are given in Beath, 
Katsoulacos, and Ulph (1989). Since the issues we wish to discuss in this sec- 
tion arise even if there is a single industry, we will confine attention to the case 
of a single industry and drop all subscripts. Thus the two firms in countries 1 
and 2 (which we will call firms 1 and 2) have initial unit costs a and b, respec- 
tively. They compete to discover a new technology with unit costs c <  min (a, 
b).  Whichever firm discovers this first obtains an infinitely lived and effective 
patent on this new technology, so there is a single prize to be won, which is 
what gives this model its tournament structure. 
To discovery this new technology firms commit resources to R&D (hire sci- 
entists). Conditional on no one having discovered by  t, the probability that a 
firm will discover in the time interval (t, t + dt) depends on the flow rate of 
resources it devotes to R&D (number of scientists hired) at t-so  there is no 
learning by doing. Thus the problem is stationary in that if one firm chooses 
to commit a constant flow rate of resources to R&D, the optimal response of 
the other is to also commit a constant flow rate. The constant flow rate of 
scientists hired by firm  1 will be denoted by x,  that by firm 2 by y. For simplic- 
ity we will assume that the hazard rate corresponding to x (  y) is just 4  (G), 
so there are diminishing returns to R&D. 
There are two factors which completely  determine the nature of firm  1’s 
reaction function-optimal  choice of x for any given choice of y. The first is 
the projt incentive. This is the optimal choice of x  if y is zero. Denote this by 
x,,.  Since, if y is zero, the only consideration affecting the choice of x is balanc- 
ing off the increased gain from bringing forward the likely date of discovery 
of  the new technology against the increased costs, in terms of scientists, of 
doing so, the major factor determining the size of the profit incentive is the 
difference between profits from successfully obtaining the new technology and 
those currently being earned: r(c,b) -  r(a,b). 
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amount of R&D firm 1 would do as y -+  00. Denote this by 3. This factor we 
call the competitive threat since, as y -+  OQ, firm 2 will almost surely innovate 
immediately. Given the inherently random nature of discovery, if firm 1 com- 
mits some resources to R&D there is still a chance that, even with y +  OQ, it 
could win the race. Balancing off the costs and benefits,  it is clear that the 
major factor determining  the  amount of  resources to spend on R&D is the 
difference between firm 1’s rents if  it successfully innovates first and those it 
would earn if firm 2 innovates first: r(c, 6) -  r(a, c). 
It turns out that in the absence of imitation or spillovers the competitive 
threat is typically  greater than the profit incentive,  giving rise to a reaction 
function for firm 1 like that shown in figure 7.1. There are two points to notice 
about this reaction function. The first is that x is increasing in y, for if stopping 
firm 2 from winning is a more important objective than bringing forward the 
likely date of innovation, then clearly firm 1 will respond to an increase in firm 
2’s R&D spending by increasing its own. The second is that as we move along 
the reaction function, the expected present value of firm 1’s profits are falling 
as y  (and hence x) increases. The amount xo effectively represents the profit- 
maximizing value of x arrived at by  balancing off the gains from having the 
new technology by a particular date against the costs of doing so. Thus moving 
along the reaction function from x,, to ,f  is to move further and further from the 
profit-maximizing position. 
7.2.2  Brander and Spencer Revisited 
To  see the effects of introducing a subsidy to R&D costs in country  I, we 
first need to consider the reaction of country 2. Once again, in the absence of 
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Fig. 7.2  Effect of R&D subsidy in country 1 
imitation and spillovers, it is likely to have a greater competitive threat than 
profit incentive, and so to have a reaction function like that shown in figure 7.2. 
Now a subsidy to R&D will shift country 1’s reaction function out as shown 
in figure 7.2, leading to higher equilibrium values for x and y, though, since 
the ratio of x to y  has increased, firm  1 is relatively  more likely to innovate 
first. However,  since this  subsidy is a pure internal transfer,  the gain to the 
country from introducing it has to be evaluated using the iso-profit functions 
relevant to generating the initial reaction function for firm 1. Since the original 
choice of x  was profit-maximizing  given the original equilibrium value of y, 
then, just as in Brander and Spencer, to first order the increase in the equilib- 
rium value of x  has no welfare gain. The only effect of the subsidy comes from 
the induced impact on y,  and since y increases, and since we know profits fall 
as y increases, the subsidy definitely harms country 1. 
Essentially both countries are indulging in wasteful overinvestment in R&D 
in a bid  to stop the other from innovating first, and all the  subsidy does is 
intensify  this wasteful competition. Thus in a wide class of  cases even  the 
standard Brander and Spencer result fails to go through. Since, as we saw, this 
effect enters the formulae in all the cases where the availability of scientists is 
an issue, the case for R&D subsidies is likely to be problematic in those cases, 
too. whenever innovation takes the tournament form of a race to be first. 
7.2.3 
The above results were based on a tournament model where there were no 
spillovers, and consequently competitive threats were likely to exceed profit 
incentives for both firms. When there are spillovers then the competitive threats 
and profit incentives facing firm 1 become: 
Spillovers in a Tournament Model 
competitive threat: (1 -  p)[r(c, b) -  r(a, c)],  and 
profit incentive:  {  [r(c,  b) + p .  (a, c)]/(  1 + p)} -  r(a, b). 174  David Ulph and L. Alan Winters 
The intuition is as follows. Consider what happens as p +  1. The fact that 
y -+  00 is now likely to benefit firm  1 almost as much as firm 2, while any 
R&D undertaken by firm 1 will add effectively the same (infinitesimal) amount 
to the likely success of both firms. Firm 1 is therefore just as likely to innovate 
almost surely now as firm 2, whatever R&D it does, and therefore faces effec- 
tively no competitive threat and consequently finds it not worthwhile to do any 
R&D. 
On the other hand, if y = 0, then, as p +  1, any R&D done by firm 1 will 
not just bring forward the expected date of innovation, but is as likely to make 
firm 2 the winner as firm 1. Thus the likely gain it gets from bringing forward 
the date of innovation is the difference between the average of  the profits it 
gets if it wins and if it loses and its current profits. 
Thus profit incentives and competitive threats are affected in an asymmetric 
fashion by the presence of spillovers. To see the implications of this, consider 
the case where firm 1 is currently very far behind firm 2, and there is a new 
innovation  which gives a moderate advantage over the technology currently 
employed by firm 2. Indeed assume that firm 1 is so far behind that its current 
profits and those it gets if it loses are zero. However, if  it wins it will face 
reasonably intense competition from firm 2, but will still make positive prof- 
its. Essentially then the profits that enter the determination of its competitive 
threat  are  (1 - p).r(c, b), while  those  that  affect  its  profit  incentive  are 
[r(c,  b)l(l + p)]. As long as p is large enough, its profit incentive exceeds its 
competitive threat, while, as long as p < 1, both are positive. Its reaction func- 
tion is now as shown in figure 7.3. 
The important points to notice about this are: (i) now the larger y  is, the 
smaller the amount of R&D firm 1 does, since it can use the spillovers to free- 
ride on firm 2’s R&D effort, and (ii) now the expected present value of profits 
made by firm 1 are increasing in y as we move along the reaction function from 
x,  to f-again  because it can substitute firm 2’s  R&D spending for its own 
while keeping the likely date of innovation more or less constant. 
Consider firm 2. It too will have a positive competitive threat since it stands 
to lose its monopoly position  if  firm 1 innovates ahead of it. However, since 
the innovation is fairly moderate, its profits from winning may not greatly ex- 
ceed its current profits, while given the large amount of  competition it will 
face if firm 1 innovates ahead of it, its profits if it loses may be considerably 
less than its current profits. Thus if p is large enough, the profits that enter the 
calculation of its profit incentive could be very small, if not zero or negative. 
In any event, it is likely to have a competitive threat that exceeds its profit 
incentive, as is illustrated in figure 7.3. But now an R&D subsidy to firm 1 is 
beneficial,  for it once again expands the equilibrium values of x  and y, and, 
while the expansion in x  has, to first order, no effect on country  1’s welfare, 
the expansion in y is, as we have seen, now positively beneficial, since it allows 
country 1 to free-ride on country 2’s R&D effort. Thus with tournament mod- 




0  x 
P 
Fig. 7.3  Effect of R&D subsidy in country 1 with spillovers 
reason for R&D subsidies. Thus arguments about the desirability of R&D sub- 
sidies depend rather crucially on the kind of innovation that takes place in any 
given industry. 
Note that while the analysis in this section bears some resemblance to the 
contrast in policy conclusions one obtains when policy is conducted in  the 
context of  a Cournot model (with downward-sloping  reaction  functions) as 
against a Bertrand model (upward-sloping reaction functions), what this analy- 
sis shows is that policy depends on more than just knowing whether reaction 
curves are upward-sloping or downward-sloping. We also need to know how 
profits move along the relevant curves. Thus here subsidies are harmful when- 
ever reaction curves have the same slope-whatever  that is. 
7.3  Measuring the Gains to R&D Policy 
In this section we show how the model proposed in section 7.1 can be used 
to quantify the gains to R&D policy. We concentrate on the case where scien- 
tists are completely mobile and the government introduces a uniform R&D 
subsidy. As we saw there, the effects of such a subsidy are obtained by sum- 
ming the effects on each industry, so there is no loss of generality if, to simplify 
the discussion, we concentrate on the case where the high-tech  sector com- 
prises a single representative or average industry. 
However, for reasons that will become apparent, it is important that we gen- 
eralize the model in section 7.1 to allow the possibility that there are n different 
countries or firms competing in this industry. We also focus throughout  on 
the case where initially the industry is in a symmetric equilibrium, and one 
government introduces a subsidy. This is because all the elasticities we need 
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probably perform all the calculations using numerical methods, we simply do 
not have enough data to calculate them. 
7.3.1  The Model 
Suppose we have a single industry where demand is given by 
(32)  p=A.Q 
where 
(33) 
Here A > 0 is a parameter measuring the size of the market, q, is the output of 
firm i, and E > 0 is the inverse elasticity of demand. For the moment we will 
assume that since this is an imperfectly competitive industry  E < I. 
Although the initial equilibrium is symmetric we need to explore the conse- 
quences of having an asymmetry introduced via government policy pursued in 
country 1 which could give the firm there an R&D and hence a production cost 
advantage. Let us assume therefore that unit costs are a in firm  1 and b in firms 





A.  Q-* -  A.  E  . q, .  Q-(l+C)  -  a = 0, 
A.  Q-c  -  A.  E  . 4,.  Q-(l+E)  -  b = 0 ,  i = 2, . . . ,n. 
Adding gives 
(36)  (n -  &)A . Q-'  =  u + (n - 1) . b. 
Now the profits of firm  1, I; are 
a) .  4,.  = (A.  Q-&  - 
So, from (36), the profits to sale ratio, 
(37) r/(p.  4,)  = (p  -  a)/p = [(n -  1) . (b -  a) + as]/[a + (n -  l)b], 
which, in a symmetric equilibrium, gives 
(38)  r/(p.  ql)  = E/n. 
If we now introduce the notation 
B = (1/~)  .  All" . ('  -  E)(~/E)-I  (39) 
then it is easy to show that the profits of firm  1, I; are given by 
(40)  r = B . [(n -  1) . b -  (n -  1 -  E) . a]'.  [a + (n -  1) . bl--('+E)/E. 
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aar 
1- ~)]l[(n  -  l)b -  (n -  1 - 
(1 + E)/{E[u + (n -  l)b]} < 0,  I 
--  -  {[2(n -  1)n + 11 -  (2n - I)E}/~E,  when a = b, 
and 
arb{  = b .  2/[(n -  l)b -  (n -  1 -  &)a]  - 
abr 
(42)  (1 + E)/{E[u + (n -  l)b]} 
= [2n -  1 -  E]/~E,  when a = 6. 
Here the interpretation of  adab is the increase in firm  1’s  profits if  the unit 
costs of one of the remaining n -  1 firms were to increase. If they all increased 
then we would simply multiply the above formulae by n -  1. 
For later purposes it is also worth reporting that, when a = b, then 
(43)  a.  r&,  = -(UE)  .  (n -  1 -  E) + [(l + 2~)/n]  + 
[(n -  1 -  E)(1 -  s)]/[2(n  -  l)(n -  E) + (1 -  E)] 
{ 
and 
(44)  b . rba/r,  = (I/&) .  1 - [(  1 + 2~)/n]  + [l + ~(2n  -  1)  { 
-  2&2]/[2(n  -  &)(I1  -  1) + (1 -  E)] .  I 
Note that, from (43), r,,  >  0, so that, at least in the neighborhood of a sym- 
metric equilibrium,  I  is convex in a. Of course it has to be convex at some 
point in its range, since profits decrease to zero at a finite value of a. But this 
means that the more that is spent on R&D to lower costs, the more worthwhile 
it becomes to further lower them. Nor is this a peculiarity of the particular 
model we have employed, but must be true of any model where firm 1’s profits 
go to zero if its costs get too far out of line with those of the other firms. This 
implies that to get a well-defined story of R&D spending we are going to have 
to make the R&D costs of lowering production costs rise very fast. So let us 
assume 
(45 )  a = ao.  X-Y, 
where x  is the amount of R&D done by firm 1. This functional form is used in 
much of the empirical literature on estimating the effects of  R&D on output 
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price of R&D for firm 1 is c, then the cost of achieving unit production costs 
a is 
(46)  C(u)  = c .  (a”u)”’. 
If we now think of firm 1 taking b as given and choosing a to maximize 
dab) -  C(a> 
then this produces the first-order condition 
(47) 
It is easy to check that in order to have the second-order conditions for a maxi- 
mum satisfied we need 
(48)  a = 1 + (lly) + (a . rJrJ  > 0. 
From (43) it follows that this will not be true for any arbitrary positive value 
of y and that we will need y to be suitably small, as we would have expected 
from the previous discussion. 
It is easy to check that if (48) holds then 
(49)  aalab < 0, and 
(50)  aa1ac > 0, 
so that, from (49) an increase in R&D by one of the other firms, which lowers 
its unit costs, causes firm 1 to cut back on its R&D, giving it higher unit costs, 
while, from (50),  an increase in the price firm  1 has to pay for its science causes 
it to do less R&D and so have higher unit costs. 
We assume now that firms 2 to n have the same R&D cost function, the same 
initial costs uo,  and all face the same price, d, for science. Initially we will start 
with c =  d, so that we will indeed have a symmetric equilibrium, and we will 
examine the effects of policies that lower c. 
-art&  = (&).  (ao)l/Y.  a-(I+I/Y) 
To examine the effects of such a policy let us introduce the notation 
(51) 
and 
P = b . rbJr,,, 
(52)  A = (n -  2)ap + CY’ -  (n - 1)p’. 
It is easily checked that  a sufficient  condition for the reaction functions to 
intersect in the right way and produce a stable (symmetric) equilibrium is that 
(53)  A > 0, or, equivalently, a > p. 
It is also easily verified that 
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and 
(55)  ---  db  -  -plA < 0. 
dc b 
Thus in the full Nash equilibrium it is still the case that a rise in the price of 
firm 1’s science causes it to do less R&D and so have higher unit costs, while 
it causes firms 2 to n to do more R&D and so have lower unit costs. By symme- 
try the effect of an increase in don  b is the same as the effect of c on a, while 
the effect of an increase in don  a is the same as the effect of c on b. 
7.3.2  Calibrating the Effects of Policy 
The policy effects we want to calibrate are those arising from the mobile- 
scientists case, assuming that there is just one industry, but allowing now for n 
firms in the industry. 
We know that when there are just two firms the effect of introducing a small 
subsidy is given by 
ds 
where 8 =  dwlds. More generally we have 
Now it is easy to check that, given symmetry, 8 = lln. We also exploit sym- 
metry to write daldc = dbldd, dbldc =  daldd, and to evaluate everything at a 
symmetric equilibrium where a =  b and c = d =  w,  the wage of scientists. We 
then get, after some rearranging 
(56)  dW  1  = ~.~.  r  (n -  1)  -  dr . b  ~  -  !!.a).  (a,.  c -  ab.  5) 
dsWW  n  (db  r  da  r  dc  a  dc  b ’ 
If, instead of a uniform absolute subsidy s, we had thought of a proportional 
subsidy, 8,  where s = 6  . w,  then the left-hand side of  (56)  is just the percent- 
age change in GNP brought about by a unit increase in 6,  i.e., from introducing 
a 100 percent subsidy to the cost of R&D. The term (rlw)  on the right-hand 
side of (56)  is just the share of profits from the high-tech sector in GNP. We 
can write 
(57)  rIW = (rIpq) . (pq/w)  = (&In)  . C, 
where 2  =  (pqlw)  is the share of the output of the high-tech  sector in GNP. 
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be proportional to the size of the high-tech sector. However if we want to meas- 
ure the power of the policy of subsidizing R&D it makes sense to measure the 
effects of policy relative to the size of  the sector to which they are applied. 
Thus we should divide (56) by c. 
Finally, if we wish to know the effectiveness of a I percent subsidy to R&D 
costs we have to divide (56) by  100. Thus if we let 6  = 100 . u  then dW/du . 
1/W will measure (relative to the initial size of the high-tech sector) the per- 
centage effect on GNP of  a  1 percent R&D subsidy. From our above discus- 
sion, we can rewrite (56) to obtain 
(58)  do  W  n  IZ  ac  u 
( -ac  -db  ’ b)]/lOO.  c 
Estimates of this measure of the effectiveness of R&D subsidies will be pre- 
sented in tables 7.  I and 7.2 below. 
One problem with this measure is that how powerful a 1 percent subsidy is 
depends in part on what percentage of a firm’s expenditure is represented by 
R&D. Thus, if R&D represents a relatively small part of a firm’s expenditure, 
a 1 percent subsidy might not have as much impact as, say, a 1 percent produc- 
tion subsidy, but on the other hand the amount of money given by way of the 
subsidy will also be smaller. This suggests an alternative measure of the effec- 
tiveness of an R&D subsidy which is the increases in GNP it induces relative 
to the amount of the subsidy. We will refer to this as the “policy multiplier.” 
This will be a particularly useful measure to employ when comparing the ef- 
fectiveness of different kinds of policy. 
Now the expenditure involved in implementing the subsidy is 
E =  S((W -  s,w), 




W‘ -  = w.5. 
Hence if we divide (56) by (59) we get 
dw  = L  . (n-l>. (”  .!  - 2.  r) . (”.  c -  ab  .2) 
(60)  dE  w(  n  db  r  da  r  dc  a  dc  b ’ 
where dW/dE is the increase in GNP brought about per unit  amount of re- 
sources transferred as a subsidy to R&D-i.e.,  the policy multiplier. Note that 
this measure is independent of the size of the sector. 
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We  can therefore rewrite (60) as 
(62)  6w=  {I/[?  . (-..-)I}  -dr  a  .n. (n - 1)  (-.-  dr  b - d'.  a) 
dE  da  r  db  r  aa  r 
Estimates of  this measure of the effectiveness of R&D subsidies will be pre- 
sented in tables 7.3 and 7.4 below. 
We  have estimates of  y from empirical studies. So given values for n and 
E, we can perform all the necessary calculations of both measures. The next 
subsection sets out the details and the results. 
7.3.3  The Results 
Estimates of y vary both across different studies and, within studies, across 
different industries. Thus early studies using U.S. data by  Mansfield (1968), 
Terleckyj (1974), Miniasian (1969), and Griliches (1980) found estimates of y 
in the range 0.1-0.12.  Griliches and Mairesse (1984) and Cuneo and Mairesse 
(1984) look further at the relationship of firms' R&D spending to productivity 
performance for the United States and France, respectively. They find esti- 
mates  of  y  in  the  range  0.08-0.15,  with  higher values  for  science-based 
firms-confirming  a similar finding by  Griliches (1980) that R&D-intensive 
industries have higher values of y. There is therefore some consensus that y 
lies in the range 0.1-0.15,  with the more technologically advanced industries 
having higher values. Accordingly we have undertaken calculations with three 
different values of y: 0.1,0.125, and 0.15. We  have also allowed n to take the 
three values 2, 3, and 4. 
The most problematic parameter to obtain estimates for was E. Baldwin and 
Krugman (1988a) suggest the price elasticity for wide-bodied jets lies in the 
range  1.57-2.57  (E =  0.39-0.64).  Baldwin and  Krugman  (1988b) report a 
price elasticity for  16K chips of  1.8 (E =  0.56). Based on this evidence we 
performed two separate exercises. The first was to simply calculate the welfare 
gains using values of  E ranging from 0.35 to 0.75. This encompasses all of the 
values for various high-tech sectors reported above. In table 7.1 we report the 
results of  this exercise when the measure of  welfare gain is the percentage 
increase in GNP (relative to the size of the high-tech sector) brought about by 
a 1 percent R&D subsidy. In table 7.3 we report the results using as our meas- 
ure dWldE-the  size of  the gain relative to the resources transferred as  a 
subsidy. 
An implication of this exercise is that, from (38), the pricelcost margin (or, 
equivalently, the markup of price over cost) will vary quite sharply with the 
number of  firms. Accordingly in our second exercise we fixed the price/cost 
markup, m, where 
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and then used (63) to determine  E. The values of m we chose were 0.15, 0.2, 
and 0.25. Empirical evidence suggests that markups of this order are fairly 
typical. The results of this exercise are reported in table 7.2, using as a measure 
of the gains the increase in GNP (relative to the size of the high-tech sector) 
from a  1 percent subsidy, and in table 7.4 where we use as our measure the 
increase in GNP relative to the amount of resources transferred by way of a 
subsidy. 
Incidentally, if we take n = 3, then the implied value of E from a markup of 
20 percent is approximately 0.55. In what follows we will therefore take 0.55 
as our central estimate of  E, and 0.2 as our central estimate of m. 
Let us turn then to look at the results in the tables. From table 7.1 a number 
of points emerge. The first is that while the figures are fairly sensitive to the 
underlying parameters, the majority  of parameter values produce percentage 
gains of  less than  1  percent, and values greater than  1 percent only seem to 
arise for extreme parameter values. 
The second feature is that while, as expected, the effects of  subsidies are 
greater the larger y is, they are also greater the more competitive the market 
is-the  larger n is and the smaller E. The reason is that the gains from policy 
arise from expansion of the home firms and more particularly from contraction 
of the overseas opposition. These are greater, the more elastic demand and the 
larger the number of other firms that will be affected by policy. 
Table 7.2 presents essentially similar results for the magnitude of  effects. 
Once again policies are more effective the more competitive the market is, as 
reflected by  a smaller value of  m. However the effects of  variations in n are 
less clear-cut, because now there are associated variations in E as well. 
While the relatively small size of the effects of policy shown in tables 7.1 
and 7.2 are in line with others’ findings on the magnitudes of  the effects of 
strategic trade policy, there are some crucial differences in the nature of  the 
policies and in the underlying models which make a straight comparison rather 
difficult. The first is that trade policy affects both consumer surplus and pro- 
ducer surplus (rents), and in some calculations more than half the gain comes 
from consumer surplus. We have ignored this on the assumption that most of 
the gains from price reductions accrue outside the country. 
Table 7.1  Percentage Increase in GNP from 1% Subsidy to R&D Costs 
y=o. 1  y=0.125  y=0.15 
E  n=2  n=3  n=4  n=2  n=3  n=4  n=2  n=3  n=4 
-  0.35  0.18  0.47  -  0.31  2.26  -  0.62  - 
0.45  0.13  0.25  0.51  0.19  0.44  2.27  0.27  0.92  - 
0.55  0.10  0.19  0.30  0.14  0.28  0.57  0.19  0.43  1.38 
0.65  0.09  0.15  0.23  0.12  0.22  0.37  0.15  0.30  0.60 
0.75  0.08  0.13  0.19  0.10  0.18  0.28  0.13  0.24  0.41 
Nore: Cells without entries indicate that for these parameter values the model has no stable so- 
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Table 7.2  Percentage Increase in GNP from 1  % Subsidy to R&D Costs 
y=o. 1  y=0.125  y=0.15 
m  n=2  n=3  n=4  n=2  n=3  n=4  n=2  n=3  n=4 
0.15  0.37  0.33  0.34  2.56  0.78  0.70  -  7.24  2.49 
0.20  0.19  0.21  0.22  0.36  0.34  0.35  0.83  0.57  0.55 
0.25  0.14  0.17  0.18  0.23  0.24  0.26  0.36  0.35  0.36 
Note: See note to table 7.1. 
Table 7.3  Policy Multiplier 
y=o.1  y=0.125  y=0.15 
&  n=2  n=3  n=4  n=2  n=3  n=4  n=2  n=3  n=4 
-  0.35  1.79  3.74  -  2.50  14.50  -  4.15  - 
0.45  1.37  2.08  3.77  1.62  2.95  13.27  1.98  5.12  - 
0.55  1.21  1.63  2.29  1.35  1.98  3.45  1.51  2.51  6.98 
0.65  1.14  1.42  1.81  1.22  1.62  2.29  1.32  1.87  3.12 
0.75  1.10  1.31  1.57  1.16  1.43  1.84  1.23  1.58  2.23 
Note: See note to table 7.1 
The second difference is that strategic trade policy considers policies such 
as export or production subsidies which are potentially very powerful, because 
they represent subsidies to a large part of a firm’s activities. Since, even in the 
high-tech sector R&D accounts for a small fraction of  all costs, a 1 percent 
R&D subsidy may not represent a very significant subsidy. For this reason it is 
worth looking at our second measure of the effectiveness of R&D policy-the 
increase in GNP relative to the amount given as a subsidy. Figures for this are 
given in tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
Thus if we take as our central case the values y =  0.15 (the “high-tech” end 
of the spectrum), E =  0.55, and n = 3, we see that the gain in GNP relative to 
the size of the subsidy is 2.5. Thus if the government raises El billion in taxes 
and then gives this in the form of  an R&D subsidy to firms in the high-tech 
sector, then GNP would rise by E2.5 billion. Therefore while a 1 percent sub- 
sidy to R&D may not have much of an impact on GNP, because it is a rather 
weak stimulus, in terms of pounds spent, it offers a potentially very high rate 
of return. 
Of  course, in a fuller and more careful evaluation of policy, account would 
have  to be taken of  any deadweight loss the transfer would impose. Also it 
must be recalled that we have considered the most favorable case, where scien- 
tists are fully mobile, and these results would have to be scaled down to reflect 
the degree of immobility that exists in practice. However, offsetting this is the 
fact  that  we  have  also ignored any  beneficial  spillover effects  within  the 
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Table 7.4  Policy Multiplier 
y=o. I  y=0.125  y=o.15 
m  n=2  n=3  n=4  n=2  n=3  n=4  n=2  n=3  n=4 
0.15  3.52  2.70  2.53  19.39  5.06  4.21  -  39.34  12.42 
0.20  1.92  1.80  1.76  2.86  2.32  2.19  5.56  3.25  2.91 
0.25  1.52  1.51  1.49  1.91  1.76  1.71  2.56  2.11  2.00 
Nute: See note to table 7.1 
In addition, account would  also have to be taken of  the effects of policy 
on terms of trade,  on consumer surplus, and on the policy  choices  of rival 
governments. While these are all important issues, a serious treatment lies well 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless the conclusion seems to emerge 
that giving R&D support to the high-tech  sector is potentially  an extremely 
powerful and important policy. 
7.4  Empirical Evidence 
The preceding  sections identified four issues critical to the application of 
strategic trade policy: (i) the mobility of scientists, (ii) the mobility of science, 
(iii) the existence  of  spillovers, and (iv) tournament  versus  nontournament 
R&D environments. 
Although recent theoretical work on R&D races has focused rather heavily 
on tournament models, the requirements an R&D environment must satisfy to 
be of a tournament kind are very restrictive. Effectively, the requirements are 
a single product or process that firms are competing to introduce, and just one 
central idea or technique lying behind the product or process so that whoever 
develops and successfully patents this technique first can prevent rivals from 
using the new technology. No formal tests exist of what proportions of R&D 
activity  may  reasonably  be  classified  as  tournament  and  nontournament. 
Clearly even within a given industry some R&D activity may fall in one cate- 
gory and some in the other. Impressionistically, however, pharmaceuticals  is 
an industry where some of its R&D exhibits many of the features of tourna- 
ment models,  while aerospace  is more representative  of  the nontournament 
case. Our view is that the nontournament model describes a sufficiently large 
part of R&D activity to make the policy implications of sections 7.1 and 7.3 
worth taking seriously. Since these depend crucially on the degree of mobility 
and the extent of spillovers, the rest of this section will examine the evidence 
on these issues. 
7.4.1  The Mobility of Scientists 
Any degree of international mobility of scientists is sufficient to undermine 
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policy purposes, however, the important issue is to measure it, because the 
scope for improving welfare by  general or arbitrary R&D subsidies must be 
balanced against factors such as the probabilities  of  retaliation, the costs of 
financing subsidies, and the dangers of  a subsidy policy being captured by 
interest groups. All of these trade-offs require quantification. This subsection 
therefore surveys the evidence on the extent of migration by scientists and en- 
gineers. It concludes that migration does occur in response to economic factors 
in the long run and finds that, for the United States, the principal conduit is 
the higher education system. The effects of migration are felt throughout the 
economy, however, because, within specialisms, there is a fairly free flow of 
scientists between sectors. 
The evidence on migration is based on three principal sources: the National 
Science Foundation  (NSF 1986,  1973), the  Office of  Scientific and  Engi- 
neering Personnel (OSEP 1988), both from the United States, and the Science 
and Engineering Policy Studies Unit (SEPSU 1987) from the United King- 
dom. All three sources rely on survey data, although the NSF also makes use 
of  immigration  authority  information. The NSF considers all scientists and 
engineers (referred to as SEs  below) while OSEP refers mainly to trained 
engineers working as engineers (Es). SEPSU deals with just five disciplines- 
biochemistry, chemistry, earth sciences, physics, and electronic engineering- 
and is cautious about extrapolation to the population of all scientists and engi- 
neers. 
The principal conclusion from these studies is that there is an international 
market for SEs, but that it is far from perfect. International flows are small 
relative to total stocks of SEs: SEPSU, for example, finds that U.K. annual 
immigration and emigration are both about 2 percent of total SEs  over 1976- 
85. Stocks of nonnational scientists, on the other hand, can be significant: NSF 
(1986) reports that, in 1982, while only 3.5 percent of SEs  in the United States 
were noncitizens, a further 13.5 percent were of foreign origin but had taken 
U.S. citizenship. Migration is more significant among better-qualified  SEs. 
The OSEP shows that over one-third of doctorate-level engineers in the United 
States are of non-U.S. origin (OSEP 1988, table A-2) and that in 1982 over 
one-third of labor force entrants holding Ph.D.s were noncitizens (OSEP 1988, 
table D-2). 
The most obvious institutional feature of the international market for scien- 
tists is immigration control; virtually every industrial nation now controls im- 
migration to try to ensure that available jobs go to suitably qualified local resi- 
dents.  In  the  United  States, for  example,  overall  immigration  quotas  are 
imposed, and the secretary of labor has to certify that each act of permanent 
immigration “will not adversely affect the wages or working conditions of sim- 
ilarly employed labor” (NSF 1986). Places are granted to would-be immigrants 
on the basis of shortages of skills, and OSEP reports that, across broad subject 
areas,  Ph.D.-level  immigration  is positively  correlated  with  reported  skill 
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however, although foreign-born S/Es account for relatively high proportions of 
researchers in fields that were previously unfashionable in the United States 
but are now of high commercial significance (OSEP 1988, 3). Thus it appears 
that immigration does serve to alleviate crucial skill shortages, especially at 
high levels. 
Two  exceptions make it relatively straightforward for S/Es to immigrate 
even if, at the time of entry, they are not highly qualified or experienced. First, 
temporary work visas of  one year’s duration are granted liberally to SEs  and 
without quota limits (NSF 1986). Moreover, these visas are renewable and in 
many cases can be translated into permanent visas and eventually into natural- 
ization without great difficulty. Temporary visas are automatically granted to 
foreign engineering students on graduation in order that they may obtain prac- 
tical training in the United States. The temporary visa system brings several 
benefits to the functioning of U.S. skilled labor markets. First, it permits short- 
run adjustment to shortages; for example, in 1978, the latest year recorded, 30 
percent of foreign S/Es admitted were on temporary visas (NSF 1986). Sec- 
ond, the temporary visa system offers an effective screening mechanism of 
candidates’ ability, motivation, and the like; permanent immigration will be 
possible only if they find a sponsor/employer  and so will require some minimal 
standard of performance. Such screening clearly enhances immigration as a 
means of increasing and improving the labor force. 
The second fast track through immigration formalities is the education sys- 
tem-especially  at the second-degree level. Foreigners on temporary visas ac- 
counted for 40 percent of  engineering enrollments in U.S. doctorate-giving 
institutions and 41 percent of Ph.D.s awarded by U.S. engineering schools in 
1985; in 1982, 62 percent of foreign S/E Ph.D. recipients stayed in the United 
States. Two-thirds of  engineering postdoctorates were foreign (noncitizen) in 
1985, rising to four-fifths in metallurgy/materials engineering, and half of  all 
engineering assistant professors under 35 years of age were foreign. Around 
80 percent of non-U.S.  origin S/Es employed in the United States in 1982 had 
received U.S. training and 80 percent had entered the United States after the 
age of  15, presumably for the express purpose of work or training. Most of the 
growth of employment of S/Es of foreign-origin since 1972 has been among 
naturalized citizens, not aliens. Thus it would hardly be an exaggeration to say 
that a principal function of the U.S. higher education system has been to supply 
the U.S. economy with S/Es from abroad on a fairly permanent basis. 
Although there are few discernible patterns in the specialisms of U.S. for- 
eign S/Es, there are patterns in their occupations. Foreign-origin S/Es are un- 
derrepresented in the defense and government sectors relative to industry as a 
whole and relatively overrepresented in education and the hospitalhonprofit 
sectors (NSF 1986). They are concentrated in research and development/de- 
sign tasks and are underrepresented in general management (though not the 
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portion of  foreign-origin staff in education-they  are not overrepresented in 
teaching. The OSEP suggests that foreign and foreign-born engineers earn the 
same wages as indigenous engineers once allowance is made for qualifications, 
age, field, experience, and so forth. This suggests that within skill and subject 
groups, foreign and domestic S/Es are good substitutes. U.K. evidence also 
suggests fairly high  mobility between  sectors (university, industry, govern- 
ment), so that overall we may conclude that for each specialism there is a single 
fairly well functioning market for SEs. 
Two sources present direct evidence on the motives for migration among 
SEs. The NSF (1973) found that economic and job factors were the most 
significant considerations for U.S. immigrants from industrial countries, while 
SEPSU found that for U.K. emigrants relative career opportunities at home 
and abroad predominated, followed by rates of pay, research facilities, and the 
desire for experience. Higher pay was particularly important to emigrants from 
the university sector. While both sources listed many other motives for migra- 
tion, they both leave an overwhelming impression that the economic resources 
devoted to science matter most of all: S/Es do seem to be attracted to areas of 
high net rewards. 
The evidence presented in this section is open to at least one coherent inter- 
pretation that has profound policy implications, not least in the area of strategic 
trade policy. The international migration of S/Es is a long-run phenomenon but 
is, nonetheless,  subject to market forces. It takes time for market signals to 
build up and be acted upon, but migration, once undertaken, tends to be perma- 
nent. A principal medium for migration is the university system, in which there 
are relatively few cultural barriers to international movement. Most liberal is 
the system of educating foreign students. At least for migrants to the United 
States, SE  doctoral studies are more often than not the first step on an Ameri- 
can S/E career. Obviously this is not universally true, and it is particularly 
difficult to identify how many foreign S/Es return home after several years’ 
employment in the United States, but the evidence suggests that the education 
system is a primary route through which U.S. industry recruits foreign talent. 
The universities and research  foundations also provide  a good medium for 
postdoctoral migration, attracting, for example, about half of  U.K. S/E emi- 
grants and providing work for a relatively high proportion of the foreign S/Es 
in the United States. 
That a high proportion of migration occurs via universities does not mean, 
however, that its principal effects lie in that sector. As students graduate, they 
mostly pass out into noneducation sectors. Moreover, mobility between univer- 
sity faculties and other employers of S/Es means that the ability of universities 
to recruit immigrants for teaching and research releases manpower for other 
sectors. It is true that foreign-origin S/Es are strongly represented in industrial 
research and development activities, but again, the ability of U.S.  industry to 
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posts. Thus even if  foreign-origin S/Es are not well represented in the com- 
manding heights of U.S. industry, their availability somewhere in the system 
makes a fundamental contribution to the U.S. economy. 
The policy implications in the context of strategic trade policy is as follows. 
In the short run, a country’s stock of S/Es is probably fairly rigid. This gravi- 
tates  away from activist trade policies for the  reasons  set out by  Dixit  and 
Grossman (1986). On the other hand, a long-term commitment to the employ- 
ment of and provision  for SEs  may  reap benefits in terms of increased net 
immigration. However, given the intersectoral mobility  of  S/Es, the require- 
ment  is  more  for  general  scientific  facilities  than  for  industry  or  project- 
specific subsidies. 
The evidence above suggests a close connection between U.S. training for 
S/Es and US.  employment, but it did not identify the direction of causation. 
Given the  strong economic motives  among qualified  scientists and the high 
stay-on intentions expressed by U.S. S/E students (NSF 1986), we suspect that 
students seek U.S. education as an entry ticket to U.S. employment rather than 
seek U.S. employment as a result of obtaining a U.S. education. In other words, 
it is likely that  stimulating the demand  for scientists is more effective  than 
stimulating the supply. 
In terms of the model considered in section 7.1 and calibrated in section 7.3 
there seems to be a significant amount of  mobility, which could help justify 
policies of support for the high-tech sector. Moreover the degree of mobility 
among engineers seems to be as high as among scientists, so it is possible that 
the problems alluded to in section 7.1.6 would not arise. However this depends 
on our ad hoc designation of  the key workers in the development process as 
engineers, and it is possible that there are yet other strategically important but 
immobile factors that we have ignored. 
7.4.2  The Mobility of Science 
If scientists are immobile, it may still be possible to import their services by 
subcontracting R&D abroad. As we saw above, “mobile science” is, broadly 
speaking, a substitute for mobile scientists, although its implications for policy 
are rather different. It is easy to conceive of  research problems being con- 
tracted out to foreign researchers-indeed,  this paper is an example-so  again 
the important issue is quantitative rather than qualitative. 
The most detailed data and analyses of offshore R&D refer to multinational 
corporations (MNCs). Crude data suggest that around 70 percent of technolog- 
ical royalties and fees paid by residents of industrial countries represent trans- 
fers between related organizations-see,  for example, Ledic and Silberston 
(1984). Although  these  data  may  exaggerate  the  proportion  of  “affiliated” 
transfers-for  example, royalties offer more scope for transfer pricing than do 
goods  flows (Hirschey  and Caves  1981), and  nonaffiliated  transactions  are 
more likely to include other means of payment for technology, such as tie-in 
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MNCs in technology transfer is undeniable. The difficulty of interpreting these 
data for our purposes is that they include both R&D that is a substitute for 
local,  home-country, effort and  R&D  that  must  necessarily  be  conducted 
abroad because it is complementary to foreign sales or production. The former 
is “footloose” and a legitimate component of mobile science: the latter is not. 
Three sets of studies suggest the importance of production and sales activi- 
ties in determining the location of the R&D that MNCs do locate abroad. First, 
foreign-based R&D is biased toward development and adaptation rather than 
basic or applied research-Creamer  et al. (1976), Hood and Young  (1976), 
and Mansfield et al. (1979). The last found that around three-quarters of U.S. 
MNCs restricted their overseas R&D activities to improvements or modifica- 
tions of products or processes rather than allowing them to work on entirely 
new  cases. The  proportion  of  domestic laboratories so limited was  much 
smaller. Firms also reported that some third of overseas R&D expenditure con- 
tributed nothing to their U.S. operations, and fewer than one-half of  firms at- 
tempted  to integrate all their laboratories into a single worldwide research 
program. 
The second set of  evidence comes from Teece (1976). He offers direct evi- 
dence that foreign technology cannot be imported and applied costlessly, but 
rather that it requires significant inputs of both local and foreign skilled labor 
and scientists to exploit it. Although generalization is difficult, Teece notes a 
number of  common features of  technology transfer. First, transfer costs are 
lower the larger, more experienced in production, and more R&D intensive is 
the transferee organization. Second, transfer costs are lower the more times 
the technology has been transferred previously and the greater the production 
experience with the technology. Except in a small subset of  his 26 instances, 
Teece found that transfer prior to any production experience was very expen- 
sive. This last result bodes ill for transferring fundamental research. 
The third body of  evidence is based on statistical models of  the share of 
R&D undertaken  abroad; see,  for  example, Mansfield  et  al.  (1979), La11 
(1979), Hirschey and Caves (1981), and Pearce (1988). All of  these authors 
find that sales by  foreign subsidiaries are positively related to the proportion 
of R&D undertaken abroad. Hirschey and Caves also find that overseas R&D 
increases with the need to adapt products to local market conditions and with 
the level of host country R&D. 
All of  these results suggest that a substantial proportion of  MNC overseas 
R&D activity is determined by  overseas production and sales requirements. 
However, the degrees of  explanation that these studies attain are generally 
quite low; thus there still remains scope for further explanations, including that 
firms locate some footloose R&D in a cost-minimizing fashion. Only Mans- 
field et al. (1979) offer direct evidence on this. Based on admittedly very small 
samples, they suggest that laboratories devoted to minor adaptation could be 
efficient at a considerably smaller scale than those devoted to genuine research 
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laboratories. Thus it is possible that the development activities noted by  the 
various studies will form the basis of  future research laboratories, or indeed, 
given the date of Mansfield et a1.k work, that they have already done so. 
Mansfield et al. also found that Canada, Europe, and Japan had been consid- 
erably cheaper locations for R&D than the United States in 1965 (by 30 per- 
cent, 40 percent, and 20 percent, respectively) and in 1970, but that by  1975 
the differentials had largely disappeared. Their respondents also suggested that 
over the decade 1965-75  the share of R&D done overseas had expanded rap- 
idly, but that in the late-1970s it was expected to do so only slowly. This con- 
firms evidence from Pearce (1986) that the proportion of R&D expenditures 
undertaken by U.S.-owned foreign affiliates in the total R&D spending of the 
corporate group rose from 6.6 percent in 1966 to 8.8 percent in 1982. This is 
at least consistent with firms responding to economic pressures to locate foot- 
loose R&D efficiently. 
There is one further aspect of the MNC literature relevant to our hypothesis. 
Reddaway (1968) noted that U.K. foreign direct investment abroad generated 
significant back-flows of information from certain host countries-mainly  the 
United States and West Germany. In part this was due to R&D undertaken by 
the foreign subsidiaries and is akin to the R&D that Mansfield et al. identified 
as being of relevance to the parent company. Reddaway, however, also writes 
of “informal know-how” and of the United States as a “source of general ex- 
pertise” (1968, 322). This appears to entail U.K. firms benefiting by  learning 
by doing abroad, and the implication seems to be that such knowledge is trans- 
ferable back home. Further evidence of learning by doing abroad is quoted by 
Caves, who notes its role in certain Japanese companies’ foreign investment 
(1982, 198). 
Taken as a whole these results suggest that at least some footloose R&D can 
be located abroad, and thus that to some extent science can be brought in to 
overcome a local shortage of  scientists. The results are not strong, however, 
and none of the studies really tackles the question of what proportion of foreign 
science was undertaken by home-country scientists. If this were high, it would 
reduce the role of offshore R&D in supplementing home efforts. 
There are also direct but less comprehensive indicators of the existence of 
offshore R&D. For example, Porsche is reported to fund nearly 40 percent of 
its R&D laboratories’ turnover with projects undertaken for other companies, 
including a complete car design for the Soviet firm Lada. Indeed it is suggested 
that most car producers in the world make some use of the Porsche laboratories 
(Note 324/88, Science and Technology Section, British Embassy, Bonn). In 
1987, 3.1 percent of  total German-funded R&D was conducted abroad, and 
1.1 percent of  German-conducted research was funded from abroad. While 
small, these figures were both the fastest growing elements of their respective 
aggregates (Federal Republic of  Germany  1988). In  the United  Kingdom, 
some 13 percent of R&D performed by U.K. companies was funded from over- 
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On the output side of  R&D, Cantwell (1989a, 1989b) and Pearce (1986) 
have analyzed data on patents taken out in the United States. This data has the 
advantage that it records both the nationality of the parent company and the 
location where the R&D leading to the patent was actually undertaken. Com- 
paring the period 1963-70 with 1978-84,  they find evidence that the link be- 
tween the locus of  production and the locus of  R&D was weakening. Also, 
while the degree of concentration of research activity was much the same over 
the period, the pattern was actually different, suggesting that concentration of 
research activity was being driven by  considerations other than the locus of 
production or the head office of the parent company. 
The interpretation of these various snippets of information must be that it is 
possible to undertake R&D offshore and to a greater and growing level of 
sophistication than merely adapting home-country technology to local condi- 
tions. However, while such activity is growing rapidly, it still accounts for only 
a small share of R&D activity. Thus overall we suggest that offshore sourcing 
is not yet a practical means of significantly relaxing a domestic “science con- 
straint.” However, as this international mobility of  science becomes increas- 
ingly important, so too do the conclusions of section 7.1.5. It will be recalled 
that while there was again support for policies that increased the demand for 
scientists, this was only unambiguously desirable for countries which had a 
sufficiently large stock as to make them net exporters, suggesting that supply 
policies could also be desirable. 
7.4.3  Spillovers 
There are now a number of  studies that have investigated R&D spillovers 
and have calculated private and social rates of return to R&D, where the social 
rate of return takes into account the effect of spillovers. Griliches (1964) and 
Evenson and Kislev (1973) investigated the effects of R&D spillovers on U.S. 
agricultural production. They estimated the social rates of  return on agricul- 
tural R&D projects were 150 to 300 percent greater than private rates of return. 
Mansfield et al. (1977) compared private to social rates of return on 17 innova- 
tions introduced in the United States. The variation in the private rates of return 
was from 214 percent to less than 0 percent with a median 25 percent rate of 
return. The social rates were calculated to range from 209 percent to less than 
0 percent with a median rate of return of 56 percent. 
Jaffe (1986) attempts to gauge the broad importance of spillovers by looking 
at the average effect that other firms’ R&D has on the productivity of a firm’s 
own R&D. He finds that firms whose research is in areas where there is much 
research by other firms have, on average, more patents per dollar of R&D and 
a higher return to R&D in terms of accounting profits or market value, though 
firms with very low own R&D suffer lower profits and market values if  their 
neighbors are R&D-intensive. All of these effects remain after controlling for 
the possibility that the technological areas themselves are associated with vari- 
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Levin and Reiss (1984) also dealt with a cross-section  of  U.S. firms and 
estimated that a 1 percent increase in R&D spillover caused average costs to 
decline by 0.05 percent. Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) estimated the effects of 
intraindustry  spillovers for four US. industries. A firm’s R&D spillover was 
defined as the sum of the R&D capital stocks of the firm’s rivals. It was esti- 
mated that a 1 percent increase in the spillover decreased average cost in the 
long run by between 0.1 and 0.2 percent. It was also estimated that the social 
rate of return was up to twice the private rate. If we recall that, in section 7.3, 
a 1 percent increase in a firm’s own R&D spending was estimated to reduce 
costs by 0.15 percent, these results by Bernstein and Nadiri seem to imply very 
large spillover effects. However, their methodology is very different from those 
used  in the  studies reported  in section  7.3 to estimate the effects of  R&D 
spending on costs, so the elasticities are not strictly comparable. 
In all these studies the R&D spillover is defined as a single aggregate with 
individual industries not treated as separate spillover sources. Bernstein  and 
Nadiri (1988) developed and estimated a model for five U.S. high-tech indus- 
tries which allowed each one to be a distinct spillover source. The paper by 
Bernstein (1989) uses a variant of this framework and applies it to nine Cana- 
dian industries. The production cost of each industry is affected separately by 
the R&D capital of each of the other industries. He finds that, for each receiv- 
ing industry, cost effects depend on the particular  source of R&D spillover. 
Six industries were affected by multiple spillover sources. All nine industries 
were influenced by  R&D spillovers, and the cost reductions  attributable  to 
these ranged from 0.005 percent for chemical products to 1.082 percent for 
electrical products. Private rates of return to R&D ranged from 24 to 47 per- 
cent, approximately 2 and one-half times the returns on physical capital. Social 
rates of return ranged from four times the private rate (for nonelectrical  ma- 
chinery) to twice the rate. Unfortunately, none of these studies deal with inter- 
national R&D spillovers, so while there clearly is considerable knowledge dif- 
fusion between Europe, Japan, and the United States, we have no feel for its 
quantitative impact on technology and costs. 
7.5  Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that the recent literature on strategic trade pol- 
icy provides a natural framework in which to discuss some issues of manpower 
policy, while conversely, arguments about trade and industrial policies toward 
the high-tech sector depend critically on certain manpower issues. In particular 
we have shown that the view one takes of policy depends critically on whether 
it is scientific manpower or science itself which is mobile. We have also shown 
that, in an international context, spillovers can undermine rather than support 
the case for policy intervention as they are taken to do in a closed economy. 
A calibration of our model suggests that the potential for beneficial policy 
is very great. However, a final conclusion  on this depends on a number  of 193  Strategic Manpower Policy and International Trade 
elasticities to do with mobility and spillovers for which we just do not have 
data, though what evidence we have presented suggests mobility is significant 
and growing. 
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